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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
vention may not be used as a basis for drawing a closing line from
which to measure Florida's Gulf coast boundary. The acceptance of
this contention, supported by the special master's interpretation of
Florida's boundaries as declared in the 1868 constitution,43 would
limit Florida's claim under the Submerged Lands Act to a boundary
3 marine leagues from its coastline as it existed in 1868.11 It would
also deprive Florida of the closing line drawn by the special master
as a portion of its coastline as it existed in 1868.11
Thus, Florida, like all Atlantic coastal states," owns the seabed
and subsoil off its present coastline for a distance of 3 miles into the
Atlantic Ocean and, like Texas,47 out to its boundaries as approved
by Congress, but not more than a distance of 3 marine leagues into
the Gulf of Mexico. The coastline from which these distances are to
be measured is ambulatory. Supplementary proceedings are avail-
able to the parties should further disputes arise which the parties
cannot settle between themselves.
The ambulatory nature of the coastline will, nonetheless, con-
tinue to be a problem. Offshore mineral leases in the area of the
federal-state boundary are necessarily undervalued because of
uncertainty as to future changes in the coastline. Erosion could
cause an area leased by the state to come under federal control;
construction of permanent harbor works could cause an area leased
by the federal government to come under state control. In either
case the leasehold would be extinguished. Congressional action to
avoid problems in this area seems the most likely and rational solu-
tion.
DOUGLAS A. SMITH
Misprision Of Felony Not A Crime In Florida
The defendant Holland, a city manager, visited the home of one
of his employees where he noticed several plants which he suspected
to be marijuana. He immediately contacted a city police captain
who determined through analysis that the plants were indeed mari-
43. See note 35 supra.
44. See note 3 supra.
45. Closing lines are drawn from point to point along a coast to determine a base line
from which the breadth of the territorial sea can be measured. The maximum closing line
recognized under customary international law in 1868 was 6 miles.
46. See United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
47. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 84 (1960).
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juana. When confronted with this evidence, the employee admitted
his guilt, after which Holland and the captain uprooted a sufficient
number of plants to establish the felony of possession of marijuana.
In discussing the matter with the city's police chief, Holland and the
captain agreed that the matter should be handled administratively
in order to avoid unfavorable publicity. Subsequently, the em-
ployee's resignation was secured. Seventeen other city officials and
prominent members of the community were informed of this action
and signed affidavits acknowledging their agreement. Holland's
subsequent indictment for misprision of felony was dismissed in
county court, but the circuit court reversed. Upon review by com-
mon law certiorari, the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
held, reversed: The common law crime of misprision of felony is
not part of the substantive criminal law of the state of Florida.
Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
The legislature has not prescribed misprision of felony as a
crime nor, prior to Holland, had the Florida courts ever dealt with
the subject. The offense did exist, however, at common law as the
"bare failure of a person with knowledge of the commission of a
felony to bring the crime to the attention of the proper authorities,"'
and absent statutes to the contrary, such common law crimes are
in full force in Florida pursuant to Florida Statutes sections 775.012
and 2.01.1
Despite the relatively clear wording of sections 2.01 and 775.01,
two divergent views have been adopted by the Florida courts in
applying English common law principles. One view adheres to a
literal reading of sections 2.01 and 775.01; the applicability of a
common law rule is determined strictly on the basis of its consist-
ency with constitutional principles or legislative intent. The second
view examines the usefulness of the common law rule in light of
modern society.
1. 302 So. 2d at 807, citing 1 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL LAW § 699 (8th ed. 1892); 1 CHITrY,
A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 3 (1819); 20 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF LAW 803-04 (2d ed. 1902). See generally Day, Extent to Which the English Common
Law and Statutes Are in Effect, 3 U. FLA. L. REV. 303 (1950).
2. FLA. STAT. § 775.01 (1973) states:
The common law of England in relation to crimes, except so far as the same
relates to the modes and degrees of punishment, shall be of full force in this state
where there is no existing provision by statute on the subject.
3. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1973) states:
The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local
nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the fourth day of July,
1776, are declared to be of force in this state; provided, the said statutes and
common law be not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United
States and the acts of the legislature of this state.
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Following the first approach, statutory abrogation or modifica-
tion of certain common law rules has been recognized by some
courts in both criminal and non-criminal areas.4 In recognizing the
statutory revision of common law crimes, Florida courts have added
the qualification that such statutes should be strictly construed.'
But with respect to non-criminal common law rules, many Florida
courts have been more liberal and have held that if the common law
is simply inconsistent with a general area of statutory law, the com-
mon law rule is impliedly modified.'
These courts have not always abrogated or modified the com-
mon law rule in applying sections 2.01 and 775.01, however, and
cases in which courts have adopted the applicable common law rule
because of a lack of constitutional or statutory inconsistency have
most frequently been in the area of criminal law.7 The leading case
in this area is State v. Egan' in which the Supreme Court of Florida
held that the common law offense of nonfeasance had not been
expressly abolished by statute and thus was enforceable.
The court in Egan was faced with questions similar to those
found in Holland. The first question posed in Egan was one of statu-
tory construction. The court observed that "no statute [should] be
4. Inconsistencies between a common law rule and provisions of either the United States
or Florida constitutions have also been recognized by many courts. In dealing with conflicts
between the common law and the Florida Declaration of Rights, however, courts have held
that mere inconsistency is not enough to abrogate the common law. Courts which have
abrogated the common law in such instances have thus tended to combine several reasons
and methods for modifying the common law. See, e.g., Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
1971) (denial of right of wife to seek damages for loss of consortium as a result of injuries to
her husband proximately caused by negligence of another held to violate the equal protection
clause of United States Constitution); Gaston v. Pittman, 224 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1969) (common
law rule that divorced woman could not maintain an action against her former husband for
tort committed by him prior to their marriage was contrary to intendments, effects, purposes
and objects of Florida Declaration of Rights).
5. See, e.g., State v. Coleman, 131 Fla. 892, 180 So. 357 (1938).
6. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Miami, 127 Fla. 426, 173 So. 150 (1937) (statute impliedly
modified doctrine of non-liability of municipality for negligence in government function in
case where jailor did not separate prisoners with veneral disease); Ballenger v. Mark, 115 Fla.
95, 155 So. 106 (1934) (concurring opinion) (statute impliedly modified doctrine that woman
not responsible for her torts during coverture); Wax v. Wilson, 101 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1958) (divorce statute impliedly modified common law rule that wife who leaves husband
relinquishes her right to dower).
7. E.g., common law crimes or defenses to crimes were upheld in the following cases:
State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973) (crime of nonfeasance); Duckworth v. Boyer, 125 So.
2d 844 (Fla. 1960) (crime of prison break); Croft v. Culbreath, 150 Fla. 60, 6 So. 2d 638 (1942)
(in the statutory offense of contempt, the common law defense of a sworn answer of the
alleged condemnor fully denying the charge was upheld); La Tour v. Stone, 139 Fla. 681, 190
So. 704 (1939) (crime of extortion); State ex rel. Farrior v. Faulk, 102 Fla. 886, 136 So. 601
(1931) (crime of escape).
8. 287 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
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construed as altering the common law further than its words and
circumstances impart";9 in response to the defendant's argument
that the offense of nonfeasance itself should be abrogated because
there was no longer any necessity for its continued existence, the
court reasoned that whenever a principle of the common law is
clearly established, it must be judicially enforced until it is specifi-
cally repealed by the legislature. Clearly the courts would be func-
tioning as a legislative body if they abrogated the common law.
Exceptions to this general rule are permissible only when the com-
mon law is in doubt or when a factual situation is presented which
is not within established precedents. Only in these exceptional cir-
cumstances may the court consider the changes in our social and
economic customs and present conceptions of right and justice.
Alternatively, the defendants in Egan argued that since the
entire scope of common law crimes has fallen into disuse, there is
no need or reason to retain or revive them. In response, the supreme
court reiterated that a legislative enactment may be repealed by
further legislation and not by time or changed conditions as seen
through the eyes of a panel of judges.
A line of reasoning similar to that expressed in Egan can be
found in early cases dealing with tort law.'" Most of these cases held
that the common law should be changed only by the legislature"
and that if the common law is clear it must be followed. However,
some of these cases have since been overturned in accordance with
the theory that the common law of contracts and torts is judge-made
and therefore can be altered by judges.'3
9. Id. at 6.
10. For example, common law rules concerning torts were upheld in the following cases:
City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1953) (municipal corporation is not liable for all
tortious acts of its police officers committed as incident to exercise of purely governmental
function); Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952) (a wife may not sue to recover for loss of
consortium); Owen v. Baggett, 77 Fla. 582, 81 So. 888 (1919) (governmental officials are not
liable for personal injury from negligent construction of a public edifice); Wong v. City of
Miami, 229 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) (governmental unit; has no responsibility for
damage inflicted upon its citizens or property as result of riot or unlawful assembly); Gordon
v. City of Belle Glade, 132 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961) (municipal corporation is not liable
for intentional tortious acts of its police officers committed incident to exercise of purely
governmental function).
11. See City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1953); Kennedy v. City of Daytona
Beach, 132 Fla. 675, 182 So. 228 (1938); Owen v. Baggett, 77 Fla. 582, 81 So. 888 (1919).
12. Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952).
13. See, e.g., Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971), overruling Ripley v. Ewell, 61
So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952); City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965), overruling
Gordon v. City of Belle Glade, 132 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957), overruling City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1953).
19751
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In following the second, less restrictive, view as to proper appli-
cation of English common law in Florida, several courts have gener-
ally ignored the mandate of sections 2.01 and 775.01 and have al-
tered or abridged the common law without a finding of constitu-
tional or statutory inconsistency. The basis for the courts' action
in such instances has been an application of the maxim: "Where the
reason for a rule of the common law, which is the spirit and soul of
that law, fails, the rule itself fails."' 5 Even in applying this maxim,
some courts have modified the common law only if its meaning was
not clear;" others, however, have made changes regardless of the
clarity of the common law.'7 Nonetheless, prior to Holland, Florida
courts had restricted the use of this approach to changes in the non-
criminal areas of contract, tort, and real property law.
In Holland, the court noted that the case could be dealt with
in a number of ways. One approach would be to construe the facts
in a way that would require a finding of not guilty. While misprision
of felony is applicable only to one who fails to bring knowledge of
the commission of a crime to the proper authorities,'8 Holland had
actually reported the crime to the proper authorities. Arguably,
therefore, Holland had no further duty under the common law. The
court declined to follow this approach. A second possible approach
would have been to follow the lead of other cases and modify the
common law crime by adding as a necessary element, the existence
of evil motive.'9 The Holland court decided not to adopt this ap-
14. See note 4 supra.
15. Banfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 140 So. 893, 898 (1932); see, e.g., common law
rules altered in the following cases: Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (the doctrine
of contributory negligence replaced by the doctrine of comparative negligence); City of Miami
v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965) (a municipality is liable for intentional torts committed
by employees acting within the scope of their employment); Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d
791 (Fla. 1959) (owner of property with portions of its boundaries under water of a land-
locked, non-navigable lake may use all of the lake for boating, fishing, and bathing, so long
as he does not interfere with rights of others and such owner does not have exclusive dominion
over water overlying his land); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957)
(a municipality is liable for negligent torts committed by employees acting within the scope
of their employment); Morgenthaler v. First Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 80 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1955)
(the guide at all times in construing wills is the intent of the testator); Randolph v. Randolph,
146 Fla. 491, 1 So. 2d 480 (1941) (father has no right of custody superior to that of mother).
16. See, e.g., Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959); Morgenthaler v. First Atlantic
Nat'l Bank, 80 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1955).
17. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
18. See note 2 supra.
19. 302 So. 2d at 810, citing Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 61 N.E.2d 849
(1945). The court in Lopes suggested that if faced with the question, they would interpret
the crime of misprision to include the element of evil motive. See also State v. Wilson, 80
Vt. 249, 67 A. 533 (1907).
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proach either, fearing that the crime of misprision of felony in the
modified form would be a mere facsimile of the crime of accessory
after the fact.20 A third approach, and the one embraced by the
Holland court, was simply to abrogate the common law crime with-
out regard to any possible expression of legislative intent. Holland
is therefore novel in that it is the first Florida case to follow this
approach in the area of criminal law.
The court observed that the statutes adopting the common law
were almost universally interpreted to adopt the common law of
England only to the extent that such laws were consistent with the
existing physical and social conditions in the state.2 It was reasoned
that inconsistency resulted if the basis for the rule at common law
had ceased to exist.2" In interpreting section 775.01, the court sum-
marily concluded that the Florida State Legislature had "recog-
nized this judicial precept . "..."23 In support of its statutory inter-
pretation and the application of this maxim, the court cited several
tort cases in which it had been used to modify the common law
while noting that the application of this precept had the effect of
granting to the courts "[t]he discretion necessary to prevent blind
adherence to those portions of the common law which are not suited
to our present conditions, [or] our public policy . ... 1
The court examined the history of the crime of misprision in
order to determine if it was inconsistent with either the conditions
existing when Florida adopted the common law or present physical
and social conditions. The law was viewed as a product of com-
munal responsibility in the tithing group existing in medieval Eng-
land.2" The court pointed out that in both 18th century and present
day society, professional police work, not communal responsibility,
was relied upon to keep the peace. Due to this shift in responsibility,
the court concluded that the reason for the rule existed neither when
the common law was adopted by the state nor at the present time.
Therefore, the rule was never adopted by the state and thus did not
presently exist. To support this finding, the court cited a Michigan
20. FLA. STAT. § 776.03 (1973).
21. 302 So. 2d at 808, citing 15A C.J.S. Common Law § 11 (1967).
22. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
23. 302 So. 2d at 808.
24. Id., citing Margrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Morgenthaler
v. First Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 80 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1955); Waller v. First Sav. & Trust Co., 103
Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1931); Wax v. Wilson, 101 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
25. 302 So. 2d at 808.
26. Id. at 809, citing 1 WHARTON CRIMINAL LAW § 289 (12th ed. 1932); 9 HALSBURY, THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND § 580, n.1 (Hailsham ed. 1933); STEPHEN'S DIGESTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, articles
156, 157, see 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 338 (1940).
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case which abrogated misprision on the same grounds. 7
A further inconsistency in the law of misprision was noted in
Holland. The court opined that the law should not be blindly ad-
hered to if not suited to our traditions or our sense of right and
justice. Several other Florida cases have also modified the common
law on this ground." Implicitly following the reasoning of these prior
cases, the Holland court found that the fear of the consequences of
a violation of the duty to get involved "is a fear from which our
traditional concepts of peace and quietude guarantee freedom."3I In
summary, the court stated: "We cherish the right to mind our own
business when our own best interests dictate."'"
The court found additional support for its finding of inconsist-
ency in an examination of the harshness of the law. It observed that
enforcement of the crime was "summary, harsh, and oppressive
. . t"32 On this point the court cited Chief Justice Marshall, who
had said, "It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender,
and to proclaim every offense which comes to his knowledge; but the
law which would punish him in every case for not performing this
duty, is too harsh for man."33 As an example of the potential harsh-
ness of the application of misprision of felony, it was pointed out
that the seventeen individuals who had signed affidavits in agree-
ment with defendant's position could also have been indicted in the
principal case.
While much can be said in favor of the Holland decision,34 the
rationale of the court does not appear to justify its holding. Three
basic reasons exist for this conclusion: (1) the court found the basis
for its decision in tort law despite a prior supreme court decision
refusing to apply these principles in the area of criminal law; (2) the
court contradicted itself; and (3) strong policy considerations sug-
gest that the law and its purpose are not necessarily obsolete or
overly harsh.
The Holland court found justification for its statutory interpre-
tation and its determination in several tort cases which had rejected
"anachronistic" common law concepts" by applying a test of "in-
27. People v. Lefkowitz, 294 Mich. 263, 293 N.W. 642 (1940).
28. 302 So. 2d at 808.
29. See cases cited note 7 supra.
30. 302 So. 2d at 810.
31. Id.
32. 302 So. 2d at 809.
33. Id., citing Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556, 575-576 (1822).
34. For example, concern about the harshness of the law might be sufficient justification
for the court's decision.
35. See note 26 supra.
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consistency." Yet less than one year prior to Holland the Supreme
Court of Florida, in State v. Egan," refused to construe section
775.01 to apply this test of "inconsistency" in determining the ap-
plicability of a common law crime. The Egan court thus refused to
extend this modern standard to areas of criminal law and held:
Whenever a principle of the common law has been once clearly
established, the courts of this country must enforce it until re-
pealed by the legislature, as long as there is a subject matter for
the principle to operate on, and although the reason, in the opin-
ion of the court, which induced its original establishment may
have ceased to exist.
3 7
Although both Holland and Egan dealt with common law crimes,
the Holland court completely disregarded this holding, thus appar-
ently practicing selective suppression to enable it to reach the de-
sired result.
This approach, however, did not completely suppress the rea-
soning exhibited by the supreme court in Egan. Ironically, to sup-
port its use of the inconsistency test the court cited with apparent
approval the following language from Duval v. Thomas:" "It is...
only when the common law is clear that we must observe it.""3 This
policy of changing the common law only when it is unclear is com-
pletely in line with the holding in Egan. The common law of mispri-
sion appears to be extremely clear.40 The Holland court itself ap-
peared to find no difficulty in defining and documenting a history
of the offense.4 Thus, the court did not meet the burden which it
imposed upon itself to demonstrate the non-crystallization of the
offense of misprision and its holding is therefore a contradiction of
its own reasoning.
There are strong policy considerations favoring the mainte-
nance of this common law offense. Assuming arguendo that the
Holland court was correct in stating that the police have assumed
primary responsibility for the keeping of the peace, it does not nec-
essarily follow that the crime of misprision of felony has become
obsolete.2 Today, the pressures generated by our crowded urban
society have resulted in increased crime and violence and the police
36. 287 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971); see note 9 supra.
37. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
38. 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959).
39. Id. at 795.
40. See note 1 supra.
41. 302 So. 2d at 809, citing 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 338 (1940).
42. In agreement with the finding on non-obsolescence: R. v. Crimmins [1959] Vict. 270
(Aust. Vic. Sup. Ct. F.C.).
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alone are unable to protect the peace. An illustration given national
publicity occurred a number of years ago in New York City. Kitty
Genovese was brutally murdered after several futile attempts to
escape from her assailant while at least a dozen onlookers made no
attempt to call police or render assistance.43 No doubt this tragedy
is not peculiar to New York and has occurred elsewhere with less
notoriety. In situations such as these, it is arguable that if a known
duty existed to inform the police, the victims might have been
saved. It is submitted that communal responsibility is needed to
help the police in their effort to protect society. One should not be
able to hide behind his "own best interests," as the Holland court
would allow him to do," when doing so would jeopardize the welfare
of others. The possible harshness that the retention of the offense
might cause is not sufficient justification for its abrogation. The
harshness of the rule is more than alleviated by the benefits society
would likely derive from its retention.
MICHAEL KELLY
43. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1964, at 1, col. 4.; Editorial, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1964, at 18,
col. 2. Twenty minutes passed between the time witnesses saw Kitty first attacked and when
she was finally murdered. Had the police been called immediately, they could have arrived
in a maximum of ten minutes.
44. 302 So. 2d at 810.
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